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RECENT CASES.
BASTAItDY-EVIDENC-BATARD CHILD - RESMBLANCE. - Shailer v.
Bullock, 61 Atl. 65 (CoN.).-Held, that in a prosecution for bastardy, the al-
leged bastard child, ten months of age, was admissible in evidence to show a
resemblance of features between it and defendant, alleged to have been its
father.
Admissibility of child as evidence in such proceedings recognized in
England without question. Douglas Case, 2 Harqt. Collect Jurid. 402. In
United States weight of authority supports English ruling. Gilmantan v.
Haw. 38 N. H. xoa; Scott v. Donovan, 153 Mass. 378; State '. Woodruff 67
N. C. 89. Contra: Clark v. Bradstreet, 80 Me. 454; Hanawalt v. State,
64 Wise 84. Main objection in such cases appears to be that child was too
young to bear reliable resemblance. Some states admit child in evidence for
such purpose only when it has attained some degree of maturity. Child two
years and one month old admitted in State v, Smith, 54 Iowa, xo4. but in
same state child three months old not admitted. State v. Danforth, 48 Iowa
331. Rule is well established that a child is admissible as evidence to show
face characteristics. Danford v. Guy, 23 Ark. so; Bryan v. Walton. 20
Ga. 480; Warlick v. White, 76 N. C. x75. Where fact of resemblance has
been regarded by the court as having probative value, the production of the
child for the better apprehension of the resemblance has been treated as
proper. Wigmore on Evidence, page 1349.
CARRxzRs-EJEcTIoN op PASSZNGxi-PuNiTivz DAMAGIs.-RICHARD-
SON v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. R., 51 S. E. 26r. (S.. C.).
-Where a passenger buys a ticket to a station which
the ticket agent tells him is on the main line, and, on changing
cars is shown by a person in uniform a train for his destination, but after it
starts is told by the conductor that it is a through train and will not stop, and
is put off with only what force is necessary, on refusal to pay tha additional
fare to the next stopping point, and is again received on payment andcarried
to the station beyond-Held, he is entitleS to damages. Woods. J. Dissenting.
Where a failure to have a proper ticket is the fault of the tieket agent
passenger is under no duty to pay additional fare and thus avoid trouble.
Head v. Gee. Pac. Ry., 79 Ga, 358; Murdock v. B. &- A. R. R., 137 Mass.
293; L. & N. R. R. v. Breckenridge, 991Ky. I. That he is obliged to pay
the additional fare. Penn R. R. Co. v. Lenhart, 12o Fed. 61 (Ill.); .Sfirenger
v. Tacoma R. Co., IS Wash. 66o; Peabody v. 0. R. &. N. Co., 21Or. 12r. If
passenger, under such circumstances, leaves the train he has the right to sue.
but if he chooses to go on after ejection he cannot recover. Lake Shore &
M. C. Ry. v. Pierce, 47 Mich. 277. Even if misinformed by ticket agent, if
conductor correctly informs him before the train starts he would have no
ground for action. I. & . G. N. Ry. Co. v. Hassell, 62 Tex, 256. It is the
duty of passengers to inquire of trainmen and of trainmen to warn passengers
not to board or remain on the wrong train, Beam v. D. S. S. &- All, Ry., 91
Wis. 592. In such a suit evidence must be admitted showing the passenger's
good faith in riding according to the information given by the ticket agent.
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Van Kirk v. Pann. Ry. Co., 76 Pa. St. 66. Conductor may rely on ticket and
not be personally liable for ejection of passenger if only reasonable and neces-
sary force is used. Ill. Cent. v. Jakson, 79 S. W. 1187 (Ky.). Passenger has
the right to be carried according to the custom of the road, but cannot insist
upon being carried otherwise. Beauchamp v. L &. G. Ry. Co., 56 Tex. 239.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-MARRIED WOMAN'S CONTRACT-lAx Loci CON-
TRACT US-GmIGUE ET AL. V. KELLER, 74 N. E. (IND.). 523.-Held, that a
promissory note drawn and delivered in the state of a married woman's domi-
cile and to be performed in another state is binding upon her as surety in the
state where it is to be performed, although she would have been without
capacity to make such a contract in that state.
It is the established rule that a contract void by the Lex Loci Contrac-
fus is void in the state of its performance. Hager v, National German
American Bank, zo5 Ga. ix6; Union Nat. Bark v. Chafiman, z69 N. Y. 538.
But where as in this case capacity is given by the Lex Loci Contractus and
denied by the Lex Solutioniis some cases hold the other way. United States
v. Garling House, 4 Ben. x94; Phazniz Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Simons. s2
Mo. app. 385; Voigt v. Brown, 42 Hun 394; Poison v. Stewart,167 Mass.
211. When the Lex Loci Contractus and the Lex Solutionis do not conflict
the Lex Lci Contractus will prevail against the Lex
Domiilii First National Bank v. Mitchell, 92 Fed. 565; Bowles &
v. Field, 78 Fed. 642. And even where the married woman does not leave the
place of her domicile but contracts in another state through an agent or by
mail the Lix Loci Contractus will prevail against the Lex domicilii. First
National Bank v. Freeman, Sufira; Bell v. Packard, 69 Me. xo5; Millikin
v. Pratt, x25 Mass. 374. But see contra. Freeman's Afi5eal, 68 Conn. 533.
Parties may stipulate in regard to certain matters as to what law shall gov-
ern. Defiau v. Bumfhreys, 20 Martin R. I., but see Van Schatke v. Ed-
wards, 2 Johns. Cas. 355.
CoNSTITUTIoNAL LAw-CHINEsz EXCLUSION-CLAIM OF CITIZENSHIP.-
UNITED STATES V. TU ToY,25 SP. CT. 644.-Held, that the decision of the Sec-
retary of Commerce and Labor affirming the denial by immigration officers of
the right of a person of Chinese descent to enter the United States is conclu-
sive on the Federal courts under the act of August IS, 1894.
This case, analogous to two earlier decisions must be considered good
law. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, x69 U, S. 649; Chtn Bak Kan v. U.
S., 185 U. S. 193. But see dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Brewer and also
United States v. Gee Mun Sang, 93 Fed. 365. United States v. Sing Tuck,
194 U. S. z6r, does not decide the question. Where citizenship is not claimed
the secretary's decision is final in all cases. See authorities cited and In re
Lee Gee Ling, 8 Fed, 635. Congress may prescribe rules of evidence. Uni
ted States v. Williams, 83 Fed. 997; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U. S. 698. Congress is subject to constitutional provisions against unreason-
able seizures. United States v. WXong1uong Wong, 94 Fed. 832. Decision
where favorable to the right of entry is not conclusive on the Federal courts.
In re KiSing, 30 C. C. A. 451; In re LiFoon, So Fed. 881.
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-INTRSTATz COMMERC.-STATE v. DZLAMETER,
xo4 N. W. 537 (S. D.).-Held, that the interstate commerce clause of the Fed-
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eral Constitution is not contravened by sections of a state code making it an
offense for a travelling salesman to take orders for intoxicating liquors with-
out a license. Haney, J., dissenting.
A license tax for negotiating the sale in one state of goods in another is,
in effect, a tax on goods sold and the state cannot levy a tax on goods without
its jurisdiction. Hynes v. Briggs, 41 Fed, 470; Brown v. Hanston, 114 U. S.
622. But where the one negotiating the sales has the goods with him for de-
livering such goods may be taxed, if no diseimination is made against them
as the property of residents of other states. Howe Mach. Co. v. Gage, oo
U, S. 676; Singer Co. v. Wright, 33 Fed, 121, By virtue of its power to reg-
ulate interstate commerce Congress may authorize a person to import and sell
intoxicating liquors in "the original package"; but here the power of Congress
ceases and the power of the state begins. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U. S. 422;
Re Beine, 42 Fed. 546. In such a case only the importer may sell under the act.
License Cases, 46 U. S. 504; State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 69 Me. 524. By
the "Wilson Act," 26 Stat. at L. 313, the sale of intoxicating liquors after en-
tering the territorial limits of the state is left to state legislation.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION.-CLARK 
- V.
NASH, 25 SP. CT. 676.-Held, that the construction put upon a state statute by
the state court is binding upon the U. S. Supreme Court. Harlan and Brewer,
JJ. dissenting.
On questions of a general commercial nature the courts of the United
States will not follow the state decisions. Goodman v. Simonds, 61 U. S. 343.
But it is otherwise on a question of a purely local nature such as real estate law.
Clark -,. Graham, 19 U. S. 557. Or the construction of state statutes, espe-
cially when the statute has become a rule of property in that state. R. Co. z,.
Pa., 98 U. S. 359. Where. however, the rights of the parties have arisen be-
fore the state court has construed the statute the Supreme Court will follow
its own views. Carrel Co. Smith, iir U. S. 556. Or where such decisions
have not been uniform. Enfield v. Jordan, ixg U. S. 680. Also, in deter-
mining whether a state statute is in violation of a provision of the Federal Con-
stitution the Supreme Court will follow its own judgment even if opposed to
prior decisions of the state court. R. Co. v. Palmer, iog U. S. 244; Yich We
v. Hofikins, ix8 U. S. 356. The above case not coming under any of these
exceptions was undoubtedly in accordance with prior decisions.
CORPORATIONS-AcOMMODATION NOTES-ULTRA VIRES-ESTOPPEL.-PER-
KINS v. TIMES REAUTY Co., 6x ATL. 167 (N. J.).-Held, a corporation can not
be heard to plead that accommodation notes, given with the consent of the
stockholders, were ultra vires.
Fifty years ago the courts" would have summarily declared it to be il-
legal for a business corporation to become an accommodation indorser on com-
mercial paper but to-day it will be bound on such paper in the hands of a bona
fide holder without notice and before maturity. Marshall Corpoorations 287;
Wright r,. Pife Co., 1o Pa, 204; National Park Bank V. German Mu-
tual Warehousing &- Security Co., ix6 N. Y. 281. The old doctrine has
been further modified, according to the weight of authority, and it seems that
a corporation, will be estopped from pleading ultra v'res to accommodation
paper, irrespective of whether the holder is bonafide or not, provided all the
stockholders have assented and no creditors object. Murfihy v. Arkansas and
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Louisville Land and Imfrovement Co., 9 7 Fed. 723; Holmes v. Willard, 125
N. Y. 75. The rule in Marshall Corporations 222 is in direct contradiction
to the above but does not seem to be supported by reason or authority.
FIRE INsURANCE POLICY-STIPULATION AS TO INCUMBANCES-EFFECT.-
NZHER v. WESTERN AssuRAz Co., 82 PAc. x66 (WAsH.).-Held, that where
one in possession of personal property encumbered by a chattel mortgage,
makes an oral application for insurance thereon, without making any misrep-
resentations as to his interest and not knowing that the insurance company
did not insure mortgage chattels, may recover on a policy for loss, even
though it contains a condition thatit shall be void if the chattels are encum-
bered by a mortgage. Root and Crow, JJ., dissenting.
Some courts have held that where there was a condition similar to the
one above, the insured was precluded from recovering, notwithstanding the
fact that the company made no inquiry concerning the interest of the insured;
Walter v. Northern Assurance Co., 1o Fed. 232; and they base their de-
cisions upon the principal that it is the duty of the insured to disclose all facts
which might influence the company in assuming the risk. Ins. Co. v. Lawrence,
2 Pet. 25. But by the great weight of authority the courts say thatsince the in-
sured seldom sees the policy until the contract is made and he has paid his
premium, it is unfair to compel him to be bound by such conditions which are
generally more or less technical and hard to understand; Dooly v. Hanover
Ins. Co., z6 Wash. 155; also, unless the company makes inquiries, it insures at
its peril; O'Brien v. Ohio Ins. Co., 52 Mich. I31; so that, such conditions do
not preclude the insured from recovering. VanKrk v. Citizens' Ins. Co., 79
Wis. 627.
INNS-WHAT CONSTITUTES A GUEST.-CRAPo V. ROCKWELL ET AL., 94
N. Y. Supp. uIaa.-Where one stays in a hotel for a period of seventeen
months, installs a piano and other heavy furniture, ,nd makes special arrange-
ments with the proprietors, held, that she is not such a guest, in the eyes of
the law, as to render the innkeeper liable as insurer for damages to her prop-
erty.
If any one goes to a hotel and rents a room by the month, he is not a
guest in a legal sense. Homer v. Harvey, 3 N. M.. 197. An innkeeper is not
liable as an insurer for the goods of one whose status is that of a boarder
merely. Lush v. Belote, 22 Minn. 468. If an inhabitant of a place makes a
special contract with an innkeeper for board at his inn, he is a boarder and not
a guest. Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Me. x63. If a person goes upon a special
contract, to board and to sojourn at an inn, he is not, in the sense of the law, a
guest, but he is deemed a boarder. Story on Bailments, Sect. 447. Parsons
on Contracts, vol. II, page Is. says: The special contract between the
boarder and the master of the house maybe express or implied, and a length of
residence, upon certain terms, might certainly be one circumstance, which,
with others, might lead to the inference of such a contract.
INTERSTATE BUSINESS-TELEGAPH COMPANIE.-WESTRN UNION TELK-
GRAPH Co. V. HUGHES, 51 S. E. (VA.), 225.-Held, that one state may enforce
a penalty for delay in the transmission of messages by telegraph between two
points within its borders although part of the transmission is across another
state and the delay actually occurs in the latter.
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This decision following Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, r4s U.
S. x92 adds to the weight of authority. But see State v. Chicago, St. P. M.
& 0. R. Co.,4o Minn. 267; and Neo Orleans Cotton Exchange v. Cincinati,
N. 0. &- T. P. R. Co., 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 289. Where there are connecting
carriers the rule is in doubt. Sternberger v. Railroad Co. 29 S. C. 51o;
Leavell v. West. Union Tel. Co., 1i6 N. C. 211. When the state attempts to
--regulate" rates undersuch circumstances it acts without authority. Hanley
v. Kansas City SouthernR. Co., 187 U. S. 67.
LiBEL-PRIVILEGE.-PRZWITT V. WILSON, 105 N. W. 365 (Ia.).-Held, that
a defamatory publication concerning a candidate for public office is privileged
but only conditionally,
There is a direct conflict of authority on this point. Some courts hold
that such publications are to be considered on the same basis as an ordinary
wilting. Post Pub. Co. v. Hallans, 59 Fed, 53o; Root V. King, 7
Cow. (N. Y.) 61z. Others hold that they are conditionally privileged; that is,
if made in good faith, even though false, the writer is not liable. State v.
Batch, 3r Kan. 465; Marks v. Baker, 28 Minn. x62. It must not be reckless
repetition of a rumor but must be on probable cause. Burke v. Mascarick, BE
Cal. 302; Briggs v. Garrett, izz Pa. St. 4o4. The reason is that each elector
has the right to discuss and inform others as to his belief in the fitness or un
fitness of the candidate. However, it must be published solely for the pur-
pose of informing other electors or the writer will be liable. State v. Keenan,
82 N. W. 792 (Ia.). The ruling in the principal case is, therefore, in accord-
ance with the general rule and prior decisions in Iowa. Bays v. Hunt, 6o Ia.
251.
MASTER AND SERVANT-OwNzR'S DuTy ToWARD CoNRAcToR's SRE-
VANT.-STEVENS V. UNITED GAS AND ELECTRIC Co.. 60 ALT. 848 (N. H..-
Where servant of an independent contractor, while engaged in erecting a
powerhouse for defendant is injured by defectively insulated wires maintained
on the premises by the defendant, held, that the defendant is liable since he
owed him the non-delegable duty of protection from concealed dangers.
Young, J. dissenting.
The liability here is analogous to that of the owner of real estate who is
held responsible for the injuries of those expressly or impliedly invited on his
premises. ohnson v. Sjpear, 76 Mich. i39. The relation of master and ser-
vant does not subsist between proprietor and a servant of contractor;only that
of landowner and invitee. Thompson, Negligence, §§ 680, 979; Hufcut,
Agency, 278. Must warn them of all danger. Erickson v. Railroad, 41 Minn.
soo, and is responsible if injured by instrumentalities he has furnished.
Coughtay v. Woolen Co., s6 N. Y. 124. Although the owner's liability has
not been recognized in some cases, where the contractor has full control over
the servants and premises. Reier v. Detroit Steel & Sfring Works, zo9
Mich. 244. The owner's responsibility where contractor has such control
would be the same as a landlord to his tenant's servant, Towne v. Thomisox,
68 N. H. 317, except that owner must not contract for a nuisance. Brannock
v. Elmore, 114 MO. 55.
MUNICIAL CoRPoEATIoNs--LIABIiTY FOR NEGLIGENCE-MAINTENANCE OF
SEWERS.-LocKWOoD V. CITY OF DOVExR, 63 ATL. 32, (N. H.).-Held, that
XOO
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where a city voluntarily exercises its authority to construct a sewer for the
local advantage of the municipality, it is liable for negligence in the construc-
tion or maintenance of same. And, where the construction of such sewers is
put in charge of board of commissioners, they act as agents of city and not
public officers and the city is not relieved of its liability.
That an action at law will lie against a city for damages caused by
negligence in carrying out a public improvement authorized by statute, seems
to be well established. Boston Belting Co. v. Boston, z49 Mass. 44: Rocwster
White Lead Co. v. City of Rochester, 3 N. Y. 463. Municipal cor.
porations are responsible for due care in the execution of any
work ordered by them, and if the work is one for the special benefit of its
own people, it must not negligently be allowed to get out of repairs to the in-
jury of individuals. Cooley on Torts, page 621. When the construction and
maintenance of streets, sewers, etc., is put in exclusive control of a board of
street and park commissioners it is interpreted to mean "exclusive" of other
officers and not exclusive of city. Ehrgott v. The Mayor, 96 N. Y. 264. Mem-
bers of such board are considered as agents of the city and the latter is there;
fore liable for their negligence. Barnes v. District of Columbia, 9! U. S. 54o-
Bailey v. Mayor, 3 Hill 53!.
NUIsANczs-CREATioN By GRANTOR-NOTICE TO ABATv.-GRAHAM V.
CHICAGO I. & L. Ry. Co., 74 N. E. 641 (IND.).-Wherein an action for a nui-
sance on the alleged theory that defendant created the nuisance, it being
specially found that the nuisance was created by defendant's grantor, held,
plaintiff was not entitled to recover, in the absence of notice to defendant of
such nuisance and a demand for abatement a reasonable time before suit is
brought.
There must be a request to abate. Cooley on Torts, 728. The notice
may be written or oral or by acts clearly giving the party notice. Carleton v.
Reddington, 2z N. H. 29z-3ii. The grantee does not become responsible
merely because he becomes the owner. London 'v. Mullins, 52 Iowa App.
41o. Lu/kin v. Zane, 157 Mass. 117. Although the principle "that it is
clearly his (grantee's) duty to look into the right of his grantor before pur-
chasing" was maintained in a well written opinion in Caldwell v' Gale. xi
Mich. 774, in Pinney v'. Berry, 61 Mo. 539, it was held that neither express
notice nor positive request to abate was necessary. The better opinion would
seem that the liability for the nuisance is not incurred by the grantee on ac-
count of his ownership but through his participation in and continuance of the
wrong and notice would therefore be necessary. Conhocton Stone R. v. B. N,
Y. &- E. R. R., 5z N. Y. 513.
PATENTS-INVrNTIoN-CoMBINATION OF OLD ELEmENTs.-IMPERIAL BOT-
TLE CuP & MACHINE Co. V. CROWN CORK & SRAL Co. 139 Fed. 312.-Where
a patent consists of a combination of old elements co-operating upon a new
principle to produce the same results as a prior patent, held, that the use of
the old elements may limit but cannotdefeat the patent. Gaff, J., dissenting-
To entitle improvement to protection as invention it should arise from the
exercise of the inventive facilities involving something more than is obvious
to persons skilledin thatparticular line. Pearce v.Mulford, 102 U. S. x2; Pack
zng, Co. n. Pro'ision Co. xoS U. S. 566. A combination may result eitherfrom
the exercise of inventive skill or from mechanical ingenuity and experiments,
but it is an invention and the subject matter of a patent in the former case
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only. Robinson, Patents, 228. By the weight of authority a combination of
old elements is patentable when the several elements of which it is composed
produce by their joint action either a new and useful result or an old result
in a cheaper or otherwise more advantageous way. Niles Tool Co. v. Betts
Machine Co. 27 Fed. 301; Stejphenson v'. Braoklyn R. R. Co., 114 U. S. 149. It
has been held that, in order that a combination of old elements be patentable,
there must be some new results obtained. Hoffman v. Young, x8 0. G. 794;
Stutz v. Armstrong, 28 0. G. 367. But the weight of authority is with the
present case. Rob., Patents, § 155, N. x.
TAXATION-DuE PROCESS OF LAw.-DELAWARE, LACKAWANNA & WEST-
xaN R. R. Co. v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA.-25 SuP. CT, 669.-
Where the capital stock of a corporation is appraised for the purpose of tax-
ation without deducting the value of property held by the corporation outside
and beyond the jurisdiction of the state making the appraisement, held, that
the collection of a tax under such an appraisement would amount to the taking
of property without due process of law. The Chief Justice, dissenting.
A state cannot tax property situated without its territorial limits. Coo-
ley, Taxation, 84; Darwin v. Strickland, 57 N. Y. 492. And it is almost uni-
versally held that the capital of a corporation is represented by the property
in which it has been invested and that a tax upon the capital stock is in effect
a tax upon such property. Gordon's Err. v, Baltimore, 5 Gill 231; Rome R.
R. Co. v. Rome, 14 Ga. 275; Cooley, Taxation, 396. Private corporations are
held to be "persons" within the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment relating
to due process of law. County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R. R. iS Fed.
385. This decision is distinguishable from Adams Exfress Co. v. Ohio, 63
U. S. 194, holding that it was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
where a tax was laid upon the property of a corporation in the state, assessed
on a basis of valuation derived by the rule of proportion to the whole capital
stock.
WILLS-BEQUEST TO WIFE-DIVORcE-IN Rz JONES' ESTATE, 6o ATL.
9x5 (Pa.).-Hed--Bequest to my "wife. M. B. " is not revoked by implication
because subsequently the wife procured an absolute divorce, the word" wife"
being descriptive only. Mitchell, C., J. dissenting.
It is now well settled in this country that a bequest to a wife by name
does not imply a continuing condition and is not revoked by divorce. So "to
my wife A," Card v. Alexander, 48 Conn. 492; Peck, Husband and Wife,
226; to "my intended wife E. J.," Charlton v. Miller, 27 Ohio, St. 298; so for
insurance policy payable to "my wife M. B," Brown v. GrandA. 0. of U.
W., 208 Pa. zor; as to wife in devise to "T. B. and R. his wife,"Bullock v.
LiIey, x N. J. Eq. 489; so to "my present wife "entire will not revoked.
Baacke v. Baacke, 5o Neb. i8. A will, however, is revoked where there has
been an absolute divorce and the reciprocal property right have been ar-
ranged between the parties. Lansing v. Haynes, 95 Mich. x6; Schouler Wills.
Section 426 A. The English courts,although formerly in according with Ameri-
can decisions, .ullmore v. Wynter,22Ch. D. 619 and Boddington. v. Clairat,
25 Ch. D. 685, have recognized revocation of requests by divorce in Hitchins
v.Morrieson, 40 Ch. D. 3o, and criticized the holding in the cases above cited.
WILLS-CoNsTRucTioN-BZQUEST TO CREDITOR-ADEMPTION-IN RE ARN-
TON, 94 N. Y UPP. 741.-Where the testator made a bequest to his credi.
X02
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tors-the will reciting that it and others were made in an effort to repay those
who had been kind to testator during his long illness--and the bequest was
greater than the indebtedness. Held, that it did not amount to a satisfac-
tion of the same.
Though the presumption, especially in Equity, is that a bequest equal
to or greater than the debt, is intended as a satisfaction, slight circumstances
will take the case out of the operation of the rule. Harris v. R. . HosPital
Trust Co., io R. I. 313; Cloud el ux. v. Clinkenbeard's Exrs. 47 Ky. 397;
King v. Berry's Errs., 2 N. J. Eq. 44. Pennsylvania and Illinois follow
the English decisions-a legacy equal to or greater than the debt, and not
contingent or uncertain, is presumed to be a satisfaction of the debt.
Wesco's Afheal 5S P. St. x95, But the legacy must be paid before it can be
set up as a discharge of the debt. Maloney et al. Admrs. v. Scanlon, 53
Ill. X22. The legacy is intended as a bounty and not as a payment, Strong
v. William's Errs., 12 Mass. 391. But in all questions of construction of
wills " the intention of the testator has always been regarded as the pole star
by which any construction of the testamentary instrument is to be guided."
BisfAam's Eguily, p. zig.
